



JABI Consulting

MENA Monthly Pulse

Providing policymakers, practitioners and leaders with the latest political and economic trends from the MENA region



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Message from Our Founder & CEO

Dear Partners, Clients and Friends,

When I look at the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, I see something heartbreaking but also incredibly powerful: millions of young people, trapped inside systems that do not allow them room to breathe, with extraordinary talent.

This region is the youngest in the world with over 60% under the age of 30. In some places, it feels like every street is overflowing with ambition that has nowhere to go. Youth unemployment ranges from 30% all the way up to 80%. In Gaza, it is the highest globally. Every year in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, millions of young people enter the labor market with hope, but face a reality that has no space for them. These young men and women are not a minority; they are the overwhelming majority. A trapped majority.

However, I believe with absolute conviction that **if we unlock this majority, we unlock the future of the MENA region**. History shows us this. After the Second World War, Europe rebuilt not just because of capital, but because they mobilized young people. Germany did it. Japan did it. They put youth at the center of reconstruction. They gave them a mission, a role, and a sense of purpose. And youth rebuilt their nations brick by brick, skill by skill.

The MENA region deserves the same moment.

We need a new mindset. The question is not only: "How do we create jobs?" The real question is: "How do we engage youth economically, socially, and civically so that they become the leaders of tomorrow, today?" When young people are given a chance to build something real, everything changes.

At Jabi Consulting, our work on youth engagement is not just an average "program." We see youth as capable, talented, creative, and hungry for purpose. Not as a problem to manage, but as the most powerful asset we have.

If we design pathways that combine service, skills, community work, tech training, and private-sector engagement, even in fragile contexts, we can turn this trapped majority into the generation that rebuilds economies and transforms societies.

I have seen enough in my career to know one thing: the future of MENA will be written by its youth. Our job is to open the door wide enough for them to walk through.



Hisham Jabi, Founder and CEO



Warm regards,
Hisham Jabi, *Founder & CEO*
jabiconsulting.com

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Includes an exclusive “Market Readiness Assessment Tool”



© Images via Canva.com

Gaza Ceasefire: Dream or Reality?



Two Palestinian youth react to the news of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas from Khan Younis. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

A Guide to the Gaza Peace Deal

Council on Foreign Relations

On November 17, the UN Security Council approved a U.S.-drafted resolution for peace in the Gaza Strip, a breakthrough for the Trump administration's twenty-point plan to broker peace in the region. The vote was 13-0, with China and Russia abstaining.

The resolution gives the United States a legal mandate to employ parts of the peace plan. This includes the creation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), a multinational military body that will monitor security in the enclave. The resolution also aims to assemble a committee that will oversee the security and political transition in Gaza until the end of 2027, when the [Palestinian Authority](#) (PA) will take over governance. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz [called](#) the resolution a "lifeline" for Gaza and thanked the Security Council for "charting a new course for Israelis, Palestinians, and all the people in the region alike." U.S. President Donald Trump praised the "incredible" vote on social media.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres also welcomed the resolution, saying that now is time to "translate the diplomatic momentum into concrete and urgently needed steps on the ground." Many countries have been waiting for a UN mandate before committing troops to the ISF. [Read more.](#)

What to Look for as the Gaza Peace Plan Comes to the UN Security Council

International Crisis Group

What is happening?

On 5 November, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Mike Waltz presented a draft resolution to the ten elected members of the UN Security Council endorsing President Donald Trump's twenty-point plan to end the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. The Trump plan makes no mention of a role for the Council. But in the month-plus since Israel and Hamas agreed to the plan on 9 October – whose first phase focuses on a truce, hostage-prisoner exchange, partial Israeli withdrawal and increased Gaza access – Arab states and the Council's other permanent members have convinced the U.S. that the Security Council's imprimatur is needed. Only the Council, they have argued, can give its proposals the legal gloss and international legitimacy required for the deal's successful implementation. To this end, the United States' proposed resolution has three objectives. [Read more.](#)

What is Security Council Resolution 2803, and what does it mean for the Trump Gaza plan?

Chatham House

On 17 November the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2803, endorsing the United States-backed 'Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict' – also known as President Donald Trump's 20-point plan for Gaza.

The resolution welcomes the establishment of the Trump plan's proposed Board of Peace and authorizes the Board and UN member states to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force in Gaza. The process of generating the resolution text was compressed. But its wording hides as much meaning as it gives away. In fact, the story of the adoption of the resolution reveals the tension that underlies it.

The US sought to obtain the maximum international legitimacy from the UN, while trying to keep UN influence and control over the operation as small as possible. [Read more.](#)

UNSC Resolution 2803: A Shaky Step Toward the Unknown

Arab Center Washington DC

On November 17, 2025, following weeks of diplomatic maneuvering, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted to approve Resolution 2803 (2025) in support of the Trump administration's "Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict." The resolution, drafted and actively pushed by Washington, received 13 votes in favor and none against, with China and Russia abstaining after their repeated attempts to amend the original draft failed. Throughout the process, the United States enjoyed broad and quite active support from Arab and Muslim states at the UN. [Read more.](#)

Demilitarization in Gaza: Could the Palestinian Authority Be Part of the Solution?

RAND Corporation

After the ceasefire in Gaza, the first phase of President Donald Trump's Gaza peace plan is nearing completion. All surviving Israeli hostages have returned home after two hellish years in Hamas's tunnels; the remains of the dead hostages are being retrieved—too slowly, but with the dignity their families deserve. In return, Israel released 250 Palestinian prisoners serving long prison sentences for violent attacks and 1,700 more detainees. More than two years after Hamas's October 7, 2023, assault on Israel, the worst and most vicious fighting in the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict has stopped, giving both exhausted and traumatized societies a measure of respite.

The second phase hinges on Hamas's disarmament. Only after verifiable demilitarization will the IDF withdraw from Gaza and let reconstruction of the razed and battered Strip begin in earnest. The plan calls for the deployment of an international stabilization force, while a temporary, technocratic Palestinian administration manages day-to-day affairs. [Read more.](#)

A little-discussed point in Trump’s Gaza plan could be an opportunity to build interfaith understanding

Atlantic Council

Inside US President Donald Trump’s twenty-point peace plan for Gaza is a call, largely unnoticed and buried towards the end of the text, for a new interfaith dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians.

More specifically, point eighteen reads:

“An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace.”

Most have glossed over the point, likely dismissing it as rhetorical padding or meaningless fluff. They are wrong to do so. In fact, engagement with religious

actors will be a crucial aspect of long-term peacebuilding in Israel and Palestine. If implemented wisely, Trump’s point eighteen could make a real contribution to peace. [Read more.](#)



Members of the Jerusalem Interfaith March for Human Rights and Peace demonstrate in Jerusalem. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

Israel's Political Pressure



Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with U.S. President Donald Trump at Ben Gurion International Airport, Lod, Israel, October 13, 2025.

[*PHOTO CREDITS*](#)

The Gaza Cease-Fire Deal Is Hardly the Total Victory Netanyahu Promised

RAND Corporation

Questions linger about whether the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas will hold, and how—or if—the parties will move on to the far thornier issues in the U.S.-sponsored plan that led to it. Still, it's clear that this breakthrough signals the beginning of the end.

That is, it is clear to most except the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which is minimizing the deal's scope while selling it as a diplomatic, moral, and security triumph: Israel keeps troops in most of Gaza even after freeing the hostages, with no firm timeline for further withdrawal.

The government voted to approve the first phase of the agreement—the hostage and prisoner exchange, the military pullback in Gaza, increased humanitarian aid to the strip, and the cease-fire. It did not address the harder issues: the full withdrawal to the security perimeter, Gaza's governance and “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood,” as later phases of the deal called for.

Journalists close to Netanyahu were blunt: “There's no phase two. That's clear to everyone, right?” Amit Segal wrote on social media. [Read more.](#)


A Fragile Opening for Peace Between Lebanon and Israel

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

While all eyes are on Gaza to see if the shaky ceasefire will hold, a more durable Arab-Israeli peace pact might come from an unexpected quarter: Lebanon. For the first time in decades, talking about peace is no longer taboo in Beirut. The country is having a serious national conversation about a topic once mentioned only in whispers.

That's the result of two key factors. First, Israel's drubbing of Hezbollah last year convinced a broad swath of the Lebanese public that only reconciliation with Israel could put an end to the violence that has pummeled the country for the

past four decades. Second, the Trump administration's emphasis on regional peacemaking, as seen in President Donald Trump's commitment to expanding the Abraham Accords, made the possibility of peace with Israel seem real. [Read more.](#)



With Lebanon's leaders hinting at reconciliation, U.S. pressure can help turn words into action. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

Kazakhstan joins the Abraham Accords—and redefines the geography of peace

Atlantic Council

Five years after the Abraham Accords reshaped Middle Eastern diplomacy, a new and unexpected player has joined the circle. On Thursday, the White House announced that Kazakhstan, a Muslim-majority nation of twenty million on the Central Asian steppe, will become the first post-Soviet state to join the pact with Israel. The move reinvigorates an initiative that had slowed in recent years—and hints at a broader US strategy linking the Middle East and Eurasia.

US President Donald Trump officially announced the news in a Truth Social post. By joining the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, Kazakhstan is signaling its commitment to the principles of the accords. But it likely won't be the last to join. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are in talks to join the pact.

The move highlights Central Asia's somewhat quiet, but unusually strong, diplomatic ties with Israel, which are likely to increase should more regional nations follow in Kazakhstan's footsteps. While some have dismissed an expansion to Central Asia as "largely symbolic," this interpretation overlooks deeper implications.

Extending the Abraham Accords into Central Asia marks a new phase—building a coalition of pro-US Muslim nations committed to tolerance and engagement with Israel. [Read more.](#)

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)



Elon Musk with US President Trump and Saudi Arabia's MBS during his visit to Washington DC.

[PHOTO CREDITS](#)

AI and the Arab Labor Market: Strategic Considerations for GCC Leaders

Karla Yoder & Hisham Jabi, Jabi Consulting

The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence across the Gulf is reshaping economic systems, productivity models, and the future of labor. While the GCC is rightly accelerating investment in AI infrastructure leveraging sovereign funds and launching innovation hubs, it must also approach this transformation with a regional lens. The Arab labor market is fragmented, diverse, and youth heavy. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Palestine face high youth unemployment and limited job creation for educated youth. In contrast, the GCC benefits from capital, strong infrastructure, and a large expatriate workforce that fills essential functions across sectors.

AI will not replace this dynamic overnight. In the near term, blue-collar jobs and core public-sector operations across the Gulf will continue to depend heavily on labor migration. At the same time, we are witnessing a promising trend: highly educated Arab youth from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, and Morocco coming to the GCC to launch startups, pilot AI-enabled services, and plug into world-class innovation ecosystems. That momentum must be nurtured.

To maximize the economic and social gains of AI while minimizing disruption, Gulf leadership should consider the following strategic priorities: [Read more.](#)

Europe, the Gulf, and Gaza: A Quest for More Geopolitical Relevance

Stimson Center

On October 6, the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) concluded their 29th Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting in Kuwait. The forum, bringing together senior officials from both blocs, convened at a critical moment, two years after the last JC meeting, two years after the Hamas attack on Israel, and amid the final stages of negotiations over U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war on Gaza.



GCC-EU Ministerial Council discusses strategic partnership and regional issues. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

A €1.6 billion EU financial aid package for the Palestinians, a Saudi-French diplomatic push for a two-state solution, and the growing number of EU member states recognizing Palestinian statehood are all significant recent political signals that contributed to the current ceasefire. However, Brussels has yet to fully wield its political and economic weight, which risks eroding its credibility as a strategic partner for the GCC in managing regional tensions.

Since the launch of the EU-GCC “Strategic Partnership” in 2022, the two organizations have deepened cooperation across a wide range of policy areas, including trade and investment, climate change and energy, and security. [Read more.](#)

The state of AI in GCC countries: In pursuit of scale and value

QuantumBlack AI by McKinsey

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are laying the foundation for AI to play a powerful role in the region, committing billions of dollars to cutting-edge infrastructure and technology partnerships that will power AI usage.

For example, Abu Dhabi’s state-linked G42 has announced a number of deals, Saudi Arabia’s HUMAIN is driving a massive build-out of AI data centers, and the Qatari government is investing in AI cloud capacity.

Such supply-side activity reflects the region’s determination to position itself as an international hub for AI infrastructure and services—an AI superpower. But what about local demand? Are GCC organizations equally determined to adopt AI, and to what extent are they making progress?

[Read more.](#)

Gulf cooperation council sovereign wealth funds at the forefront of a strategic global expansion

Deloitte

During the 2008 global financial crisis, GCC SWFs had a reputation as lenders of last resort, supporting large Western financial institutions. They acquired distressed iconic assets across the United Kingdom and France and provided a stable source of capital across industries in Europe and the United States.

Forged from the region's vast oil and gas revenues, these colossal pools of capital have long been a familiar presence on the global financial landscape for decades, but their attention was largely on the developed and stable economies of the West. As they grow in size and influence, however, that traditional focus on the transatlantic axis is evolving into a multipolar strategy that looks with equal measures of ambition and purpose to the dynamic economies of Asia, Africa, and beyond. [Read more.](#)

Microsoft's \$15.2 billion USD investment in the UAE

Microsoft

As Abu Dhabi and Dubai kick off a significant week hosting annual energy and technology conferences, we want to share details of our ongoing and planned investments in the United Arab Emirates. Roughly two and a half years ago, we embarked on a new AI initiative with the encouragement and support of both the United States and UAE governments. Much of this progress has involved a new partnership with G42, the UAE's sovereign AI company, with whom we're making critical progress.

All told, Microsoft will invest \$15.2 billion USD in the UAE between the start of this initiative in 2023 and the end of this decade, in 2029. This is not money raised in the UAE. It's money we're spending in the UAE. And as we do everywhere in the world, we're focused not just on growing our business but also on contributing to the local economy. This involves bringing together three critical factors – technology, talent, and trust. [Read more.](#)

UNESCO releases global report on Bahrain's AI readiness

Bahrain News Agency

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) released its global report on assessing the Kingdom of Bahrain's readiness in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), commending the Kingdom's promising progress in this technological area. The report forms part of UNESCO's initiatives to support member states in measuring their readiness to adopt AI technologies through the Readiness Assessment Methodology (RAM) in line with internationally recognised standards. Bahrain is the second GCC country to have such a report issued. [Read more.](#)

Qatar Copes with Trump's Middle East Vision

Arab Center Washington DC

Among Arab states, perhaps none faces a more complex challenge in managing relations with President Donald Trump than Qatar. Ironically, Doha's deepening partnership with the Trump administration has been bolstered by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's ill-judged September 9, 2025, missile attack on Hamas leaders in Doha, where they had gathered to review a ceasefire deal proposed by the American president. The attack not only prompted legitimate questions among Gulf leaders about the reliability of the US security umbrella but also provoked the one emotional response that no ally of Trump can afford to trigger: his sense of personal betrayal. The assassination attempt backfired on Israel, provoking regional and global outrage and having the effect of drawing the United States even closer to Qatar and into the ceasefire effort, apparently the opposite of what Netanyahu had hoped to achieve. [Read more.](#)



US President Trump shakes hands with Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

The UAE's AI strategy winds through Silicon Valley

Rest of World

The United Arab Emirates aims to become a global artificial intelligence powerhouse, and its latest investment is a new research lab in Silicon Valley.

The state-run Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence, named after the president of the UAE, has opened a satellite lab in Sunnyvale, California, recruiting researchers from top U.S. universities and major tech firms to build AI models that rival American and Chinese systems.

The outpost is part of the UAE's national AI strategy, under which the country is investing billions of dollars through G42, an all-purpose company led by its tech-savvy national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan. MBZUAI, established only six years ago, aims to cultivate a local AI workforce as the "Stanford of the Middle East."

In Silicon Valley, MBZUAI has assembled a 40-strong research team that continues to expand. Together with an additional 40 researchers in Paris and Abu Dhabi, the lab has produced models including the K2 Think, a modest-sized model that the university says matches the performance of much larger systems from OpenAI and DeepSeek on certain benchmarks. This month, the lab released a world model called PAN, capable of predicting future world states through video simulation. [Read more.](#)

Saudi Arabia’s next horizon: Building human capital beyond Vision 2030

Atlantic Council

Former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, one of the leading intellectuals of the twentieth century and a founder of the Atlantic Council, is attributed with saying, “always remember that the future comes one day at a time.” But based on meetings this week with US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the future for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia appears to be arriving all at once.

The kingdom is committing one trillion dollars of investments to the United States while receiving advanced US technologies such as next-generation semiconductors, AI-driven data infrastructure, energy systems, and even civilian nuclear technology.

The critical question is whether Saudi Arabia can simultaneously be a net importer and exporter of capital, new technologies, energy, ideas, and talent, while producing accretive financial results and a sustainable society. [Read more.](#)

Trump-MBS summit: Good feelings, real commitments, and unresolved questions

Middle East Institute

Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince, prime minister, and main decision-maker in Saudi Arabia — who is colloquially also known as MBS — left Washington, DC, and his summit with President Donald Trump with a number of promises made and commitments received but several questions yet unanswered. The multi-day visit this week consolidated the bilateral relationship,



Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman holds U.S. President Donald Trump’s hand during a meeting at the White House in Washington, DC, November 18, 2025.

PHOTO CREDITS

confirming that Riyadh still sees Washington as its primary partner in military, security, and economic matters. It also served as a personal vindication for the crown prince. Many of the Americans now feting him had criticized and shunned him for his involvement in the 2018 killing of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. President Trump was never one of those Americans and made it very clear he did not consider the killing a big deal, dismissing it by noting that “things happen.” [Read more.](#)

Middle East Regional Shifts



The inclusion of non-EU students from countries in Africa and the Middle East is part of the "Pact for the Mediterranean."

[*PHOTO CREDITS*](#)

EU plans to expand Erasmus program to southern Mediterranean countries

Politico

The EU wants students from the bloc’s southern neighbors to join its Erasmus exchange program, it announced Thursday as part of a broader plan to bolster Europe’s presence in the Mediterranean region.

The inclusion of non-EU students from countries in Africa and the Middle East is part of the “Pact for the Mediterranean”, which also includes a proposal to double the EU’s budget for this region to €42 billion.

The bloc’s Mediterranean partners include Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen outlined the three sections of the pact in a statement: People, economy, and the link between security, preparedness and migration.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas told journalists the pact includes more than 100 projects, ranging from support for 5G networks and improved mobile connectivity in the region, to youth-focused programs and “rail, road, maritime links to subsea cables carrying data between our nations.”

[*Read more.*](#)

Level Up MENA: How digital education and skills are powering the next generation of jobs

World Bank Group

Imagine landing your dream engineering role at one of Silicon Valley's top technology companies - from your apartment in Riyadh, Cairo, or Beirut. This dream is now within reach for thousands in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), provided they have the right skills.



In Saudi Arabia, the e-learning market reached a value of \$1.6 billion in 2021, with forecasts suggesting it will more than double in size by 2027, transforming traditional classroom learning.

[PHOTO CREDITS](#)

The Digital Wave is Here

Ever since the COVID-19 pandemic, MENA has experienced a surge in digital transformation. Tunisia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have emerged as frontrunners in

embracing digitalization and streamlining service delivery. For instance, the Absher platform in Saudi Arabia provides over 300 e-government services (including digital IDs, passports, authentication) to 24 million users. Egypt's YES (Youth Employment Support) program leverages AI and digital technologies to provide career counselling and employment services to young people. The World Bank's recent flagship report Embracing and Shaping Change: Human Development for a Middle East and North Africa in Transition, shows that the region's exposure to AI-driven change is higher than many other regions, including Latin America, South Asia, and even some parts of Europe and Central Asia. [Read more.](#)

Trump and MBS have big ambitions for the Middle East. Bold action must follow.

Atlantic Council

Most headlines about Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to Washington this week have focused on the obvious: cooperation on advanced chips, the Saudi purchase of F-35 jet fighters, one trillion dollars of promised Saudi investments in the United States, and President Donald Trump's claim that his visitor knew nothing about the 2018 murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi (contrary to US intelligence assessments).

The more significant story, however, is whether the visit signals an enduring shift in bilateral US-Saudi relations and, over time, the Middle East's regional architecture. Could a more robust US-Saudi strategic partnership provide scaffolding for a dramatic advance in Middle Eastern economic and security integration? If so, that would be a towering accomplishment built on the foundation Trump set down in 2020 with the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab nations. [Read more.](#)

Jordan's Uncertain Future



President Donald Trump speaks with Jordan's King Abdullah II in February 2025. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

Jordan ranks third in Arab world in AI adoption among workforce

Kazinform International

Jordan has ranked third in the Arab world and 29th globally, with an adoption rate of 25.4 percent, in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Penetration Index among the working-age population, according to Microsoft's Institute for AI Economy report titled "The Global AI Penetration Report," [Petra](#) reports.

The report highlighted that Jordan demonstrates a relatively high adoption rate compared to the size of its economy, driven by investments in digital transformation and technical education, youth empowerment and tech entrepreneurship programs, and the growing use of generative AI tools across sectors such as education, media, and digital services.

The study provides the first comprehensive global analysis of AI adoption, detailing where AI is being developed, how it is being used, and who is benefiting from it. It also examines the extent to which individuals and organizations are integrating generative AI tools and how this transformation impacts national economies.

According to the report, more than 1.2 billion people worldwide have used AI tools in less than three years. [Read more.](#)

Jordan's cold peace and warm security with Israel

JNS

Although the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has a cold peace with Israel, the relationship between the Jordanian and Israeli security services is rather warm. A stable Jordan is key to Israel's line of defense. Israel's border with Jordan is its longest, about 300 miles, and being peaceful enables Israel to focus on other critical arenas, such as the border with Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip.



The border fence at the tripoint border between Israel, Syria and Jordan, Feb. 15, 2024. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

There is, however, more to the relationship, one that is active in the shadows rather than in the open. Israel provides Jordan with water, energy and security. Then, there are the pro-Muslim Brotherhood states of Qatar, Turkey, and, especially, the Islamic Republic of Iran that sought, and still seek, to destabilize the Jordanian monarchy by supporting the strong Muslim Brotherhood cells in the kingdom. [Read more.](#)

Jordan's Economy Shows Upward Growth Trajectory with Positive Indicators Exceeding 2026 Expectations

Jordan News

The economy has exceeded expectations thanks to continuous royal attention, opening non-traditional export markets, facilitating government policies, and prudent monetary measures that have supported economic balance, boosted activity, and instilled confidence and optimism within the business community.

Key economic indicators since the start of the year include growth in GDP, increased exports, higher remittances, tourism revenues, foreign reserves, foreign investments, improved performance of the Amman financial market, a rise in registered companies and local revenues, and increased net profits of listed companies on the Amman Stock Exchange.

Economic experts noted that Jordan's economy has shown clear resilience and stability in the face of external pressures, continuing positive performance gradually, supported by government measures over the past year.

Dr. Raed Bani Yaseen, former Dean of the Business School at the University of Jordan, highlighted that economic growth improvements will enhance investor confidence, boost capital spending, and attract large investments, particularly in ICT and tourism sectors. [Read more.](#)

Egypt and Regional Instability



Construction equipment supplied by Egypt drives through Gaza City on November 2, 2025. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

The Gaza Plan Just Hit a Crucial Juncture. Egypt Is Critical for Its Success.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

On Monday, the United Nations Security Council adopted [Resolution 2803](#), which endorses U.S. President Donald Trump's [peace plan for Gaza](#). The resolution features a framework that seeks to link a permanent ceasefire with transitional arrangements for governing the Gaza Strip, gradual steps toward an Israeli military withdrawal, and mechanisms to address Hamas's disarmament. It also contains an important—albeit unclear—reference to the Palestinians' right to an independent state in the final outcome. This reference provides the resolution with a strategic dimension that calls upon regional actors—chief among them Egypt—to play an active role in moving Gaza along a viable political trajectory, rather than allowing it to dissolve into administrative, security, and service-delivery details.

The resolution treats Trump's plan as a binding roadmap that would shift Gaza from a state of conflict and humanitarian collapse to an interim phase led by the International Stabilization Force (ISF) and the Board of Peace, a multiparty supervisory body. The text notes that this phase is a transitional, organizational channel for reconstruction and the provision of basic services. The board and ISF would guarantee the flow of humanitarian assistance, manage border crossings, and implement security measures to prevent a relapse into violence. [Read more.](#)

Extended Imprisonment: The Hidden Emotional and Economic Costs of Prison Visits in Egypt

The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy

Their journey begins before dawn. Carrying bags full of food, clothes, and medicine, the family sets out on a long and costly trip to a remote prison in the desert, hoping for just a few precious minutes with their loved ones behind bars.

The logistics of the visit take over their lives. What supplies should we bring? Which foods? Will fruits be allowed in? Are bottled water and toiletries permitted? How do we reach the prison? Can we afford to rent a private car? At what time will the visit begin? Will all of us be allowed in?

Their days are consumed by questions like these, laced with dread and worry. What should be an opportunity for comfort and emotional support for Egyptian families has instead become a ritual of suffering, one that drains what little energy and dignity they still cling to. [Read more.](#)

Egyptian Democracy Is What Sisi Makes of It

Arab Center Washington DC

Egyptians are currently casting their ballots in parliamentary elections, the final results of which will not be announced before late December 2025. In two phases of voting held in different regions of the country, the first phase of which finished on November 11, voters are choosing 568 of a total of 596 deputies in the House of Representatives. Half of the lawmakers will be chosen from party lists while the other half will come from the winners of individual district contests. President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi will appoint a further 28 members—a privilege he no doubt cherishes in Egypt's managed "democracy" that ensures his control of the Egyptian parliament.

In October 2025, Sisi appointed 100 of 300 members of Senate, Egypt's upper house of parliament that has only consultative powers, following August 2025 elections in which Sisi's supporters won overwhelming majorities both on the party lists and among individual district candidates. [Read more.](#)

A More Effective Approach to Countering the Muslim Brotherhood

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

On June 1, an Egyptian national carried out an antisemitic firebombing attack targeting a group of peaceful Jewish protesters in Boulder, Colorado. Social media posts indicated the accused attacker supported the Muslim Brotherhood, prompting lawmakers in Washington to call for the group's designation as a terrorist group—something that has been squarely on the Trump administration's radar since early in its first term. The issue has now gained legislative momentum, with bills in the U.S. House and Senate that would require the administration to take this step. [Read more.](#)

Lebanon: Harnessing Political Momentum



Protesters in Lebanon wave Hezbollah flags. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

A Path Toward Hezbollah's Disarmament?

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Slowly but surely, a new equation is making its way through Lebanon's political landscape. It is one that was neither unexpected nor is necessarily bad, but in the context of the eternally unyielding Lebanese political system, it may well bring about a fundamentally new stage in the country's uneasy sectarian contract.

The equation is this: As the state continues to falter in its efforts to disarm Hezbollah, since forcible disarmament is and must be off the table, a second approach will come to the fore, namely offering the Shiite community political concessions in exchange for surrendering its weapons. Taking such a path should not be alarming, since integrating Hezbollah and its community into the Lebanese constitutional order has long been welcomed by the party's foes.

The term "political concessions" may be a misnomer. The framework for such concessions would have to be the Taif Accord of 1989, and Hezbollah officials as well as Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri have called for the full implementation of Taif. That's hardly an unreasonable demand. It would mean, among other things, deconfessionalizing the political system and removing sectarian quotas from parliament and the state administration. [Read more.](#)

Seizing the opening in Syria and Lebanon

Brookings

On November 10, President Donald Trump will welcome Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa for the first official visit to Washington by a Syrian head of state. Having recently visited Syria and Lebanon on a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees mission, I was struck by the fluidity of this period for both countries.

Almost a year has passed since transformative events occurred in the Levant. In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow after overseeing a horrific 14-year war that killed at least 400,000 people and displaced 13 million more. Hezbollah was not able to rescue him, and the Russians chose not to try, escorting Assad to Moscow instead. Russia was preoccupied by its grinding war against Ukraine, and Hezbollah had just suffered a historic set of Israeli attacks against its entire leadership and operators that left it flailing. Inside Lebanon, Hezbollah has been so severely devastated that discussions of its disarmament have become mainstream. Having led U.S. policy toward the Levant from the Pentagon and served on the Congressionally-mandated Syria Study Group, I know how rare this dynamism is—and the opportunities it offers for U.S. policy. [Read more.](#)

Hezbollah's refusal to disarm makes direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel more likely

Chatham House

Lebanese president Joseph Aoun stated last week that Lebanon has 'no choice' but to negotiate, in a clear reference to Israel. He told journalists that 'the language of negotiation is more important than the language of war', adding 'we have seen what [war] did to us.'



The aftermath of Israeli strikes in Abbasiyyeh in southern Lebanon, according to the Lebanese Public Health Ministry, 6 November 2025. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

Aoun's statement sparked intense debate among Lebanon's political parties over the prospect of direct negotiations with Israel. This scenario has been long been considered a taboo in Lebanon. The two countries have no diplomatic relations and have been technically in a state of war since 1948, although recent conflicts have been between Israel and the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah, with the Lebanese Armed Forces generally staying on the sidelines.

While Aoun's words did not explicitly refer to direct negotiations (as opposed to indirect talks via intermediaries) it is highly likely that Lebanon will eventually take this path. [Read more.](#)

Syria's Reconstruction



Syria President Ahmed Al-Sharaa is received by U.S President Donald Trump at the White House on an official visit to the United States of America on Monday Nov 10, 2025. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

On Syria, Trump is far from 'mission accomplished'

Brookings

Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa's White House visit earlier this week was another one of President Donald Trump's perfectly made-for-television moments. The former al-Qaida fighter entered the White House from a side door—and left with a promise for one more push to lift the layers and layers of U.S. sanctions on Syria. Inside the Oval Office, Trump asked how many wives he had and gave Syria's interim president his own brand of perfume. Following the visit, an announcement came about Syria entering the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State (ISIS), with unconfirmed reports of plans for a U.S. military presence in Damascus.

Bringing Syria back into the international community after half a century of Assad dictatorship and a devastating civil war is, itself, a worthy goal—and Trump deserves credit for attempting it. Trump's regional envoy, Tom Barrack, has built close ties with the new government in Damascus and is keen to make a security partner out of former jihadists. Al-Sharaa has shown remarkable pragmatism since his forces toppled Bashar al-Assad and could well emerge as a new American ally.

But Syria's monumental internal and external challenges demand a steadier and intensified U.S. engagement than the president's "victory-first, details-later" style allows. [Read more.](#)

UN Lifts Sanctions on Syria's President as White House Visit Beckons

International Crisis Group

On 6 November, the UN Security Council agreed to remove Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Interior Minister Anas Khattab from a UN sanctions list, four days before al-Sharaa's planned state visit to Washington. The two men were listed under the UN's ISIS (Da'esh) and al-Qaeda sanctions regime, in 2013 and 2014 respectively, for their allegiance to al-Qaeda, though they have since disavowed the group and even fought it.

Discussions about adapting UN sanctions have been going on since the Assad regime fell in December 2024. The conversation turned seriously to delisting in May, when U.S. President Donald Trump, at the urging of Gulf Arab leaders, pledged to lift all U.S. sanctions on Syria and al-Sharaa's former rebel group, Hei'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which was dissolved in January. Though the EU quickly followed suit, deliberations in the Security Council moved more slowly. [Read more.](#)

Building Climate-Resilient Systems in Post-War Syria

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Syria is characterized by a predominantly arid to semi-arid climate, with much of its territory receiving less than 250 millimeters of annual rainfall. Historically, the Euphrates River provided a vital lifeline for agriculture, rural livelihoods, and urban water supply. However, prolonged droughts, exacerbated by climate change and Türkiye's upstream damming, have significantly reduced water availability. Between 2007 and 2010, the country experienced one of its worst droughts in recorded history—an event widely seen as a precursor to mass rural displacement and deepening socioeconomic stress. The civil war that began in 2011 further weakened Syria's environmental governance, degraded critical infrastructure, and disrupted climate adaptation efforts. Today, climate models project a continued rise in average temperatures of at least 2 degrees Celsius by 2050, paired with declining precipitation and increased frequency of extreme weather events such as heat waves and sandstorms. These changes threaten to aggravate Syria's existing water crisis, deepen agricultural collapse, and heighten competition over dwindling natural resources. [Read more.](#)

World Bank Group Confirms Support to Syria's Recovery

World Bank Group

A World Bank Group delegation led by Dr. Ousmane Dione, Vice President for the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan (MENAAP) region, visited Damascus on November 19 to deepen the ongoing dialogue on the World Bank Group's engagement program in Syria to support the country's development priorities and recovery efforts.

The delegation met with Syrian President, H.E. Ahmed Al-Sharaa, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, H.E. Asaad Al-Shaibani and Minister of Finance, H.E. Mohamad Yisr Barnieh. [Read more.](#)

Syria joining the anti-ISIS coalition is a westward pivot—with opportunities and risks

Atlantic Council

On November 10, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa made a historic visit to Washington, becoming the first Syrian leader to meet a US president in the White House since the country's independence nearly eight decades ago. The visit was the highlight of several policy decisions US President Donald Trump's administration took this month to reinforce Washington's commitment to supporting al-Sharaa in his bid to rehabilitate and rebuild Syria.



Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

These key decisions include removing al-Sharaa from the Specially Designated Global Terrorist list, renewing the pause on Caesar Act sanctions to help spur investments, and allowing Syria to reopen its embassy in Washington to “exercise its diplomatic role with full freedom on US soil,” as Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted. Both are important and strategic gestures highlighting where the United States stands on Syria's future. [Read more.](#)

Prospects for Syria's Democratization Under Ahmed al-Sharaa

Arab Center Washington DC

The spectacular and unforeseen fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 upended Syria's political order and launched a precarious transition. Ahmed al-Sharaa officially assumed the role of interim president on January 29, 2025, serving as the head of a coalition dominated by members of the now disbanded Islamist militia that he had led, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, and a transitional government composed of technocrats and opposition-linked figures. In March 2025, the new authorities issued a constitutional declaration establishing a five-year transitional period at the end of which national elections are envisaged to take place. On October 5, 2025, indirect elections took place for 119 representatives to a new 210-member parliament. On November 10, 2025, al-Sharaa met with US President Donald Trump at the White House—an indication that the Trump administration views developments in Damascus as moving in the right direction.

Despite Syria's political progress in the past year, immense challenges remain. Decades of authoritarianism and more than 10 years of civil war hollowed out Syria's institutions, devastated its economy, and tore apart its social fabric. Al-Sharaa and his government face the formidable task of rebuilding governance while navigating the competing agendas of foreign powers including Iran, Israel, the Gulf states, Turkey, Russia, and the United States. [Read more.](#)

Yemen's Potential and Shaky Future



Houthi rebels protest the Israel-Hamas war.

PHOTO CREDITS

The legitimacy trap: How international institutions sustain the Houthis' hold on Yemen

Middle East Institute


On September 2, 2025, four days after Israeli airstrikes killed Ahmed al-Rahawi and 12 other Houthi cabinet members in Yemen, the chief of mission for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) met with Houthi Foreign Ministry official Ismail al-Mutawakkil in Sanaa. According to the Houthi outlet *Saba*, she offered condolences for the “crime committed by the Zionist entity,” expressed “solidarity” with Yemen, and promised the ICRC’s plans to provide assistance were unchanged. While the language the Houthi outlet attributed to the ICRC mission chief is likely inaccurate, the organization could not publicly dispute it. Contradicting the Houthi narrative would mean losing access, endangering staff, and even shutting down operations across northern Yemen, where two-thirds of the population lives. As a result, the statement stands in Houthi media as international validation of their government’s legitimacy, used to project authority both domestically and internationally.

For years, the prevailing assumption was that the Houthis' survival depended on battlefield victories and Iranian support. Both are essential, but there is a third critical and often overlooked factor: the weaponization of international engagement. [Read more.](#)

Israel, the UAE, and Yemen's South: The Politics of Unlikely Alliances

Arab Center Washington DC

Having emerged in 2017 from Yemen's Southern Movement, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) is the preeminent political and military force in southern Yemen. Since its founding, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, who served as the governor of Aden Governorate from 2015 to 2017, has led the organization. The STC is officially part of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Yemen's internationally recognized governing authority, of which al-Zubaidi is the vice chair. Established in 2022, the



Yemen's Southern Transitional Council (STC) leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi.

[PHOTO CREDITS](#)

eight-member PLC was created to bring together various anti-Houthi factions under unified leadership. The STC, however, still champions a separatist agenda aimed at re-establishing an independent South Yemen, which existed from 1967 until unification with North Yemen in 1990. Despite significant support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the STC has struggled to gain recognition among key regional and international actors. [Read more.](#)

Economic Hardship Deepens in Yemen

World Bank Group

Yemen's economy remained under severe strain in the first half of 2025 as the continued blockade on oil exports, rising inflation, and declining aid have compounded with years of conflict and institutional division, according to the World Bank's latest Yemen Economic Monitor. The Fall 2025 edition, "Navigating Increased Hardship and Growing Economic Fragmentation," finds that real GDP is projected to decline by 1.5 percent in 2025, a contraction that threatens to further heighten food insecurity across the country.

In areas under the control of the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG), households are facing mounting economic hardship as inflation erodes purchasing power. As of June, the price of a basic food basket was 26 percent higher than a year earlier, following a marked depreciation of the Yemeni rial on the Aden market, which reached an all-time low of YER 2,905 per US dollar in July. Stabilization measures helped strengthen the currency, bringing the exchange rate back to YER 1,676 per US dollar by early August. The report highlights that IRG revenues fell by 30 percent compared to the same period last year, forcing the government to implement spending cuts that have disrupted public services and delayed salary payments to civil servants. [Read more.](#)

USAID and Foreign Aid Legacies



A flag outside the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) headquarters in Washington, D.C. on Feb. 3. The agency was shut down on July 1; remaining programs have been transferred to the State Department. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

USAID Youth Engagement: A Potential Generation Lost?

Center for Strategic and International Studies

The arrival of the second Trump administration led to tectonic and unprecedented shifts in the global development sector. One of the most significant changes was the dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) based on criticisms of fraud, waste, and wokeism. While significant attention has been on the United States, there have been staggering reductions in official development assistance (ODA) from other Western donors, such as France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, which announced a €2 billion cut to its main development aid delivery instrument. Much of the focus in recent months has been on the implications for health initiatives, humanitarian assistance, and other life-saving programs. However, we have seen little discussion on the loss of USAID funding to youth programming and engagement. There is a real need to understand what USAID funds are on youth programming, the importance of investing in youth within the broader development agenda, and what the short- and long-term implications of this funding gap are.

Q1: What youth programming did USAID fund?

A1: USAID funded youth-specific programming under two main frameworks: the Positive Youth Development (PYD) and the Youth Workforce Development (YWFD). Under PYD, USAID oversaw the implementation of laws and policies to promote youth participation at all levels of society, youth well-being resources, training in soft and life skills, and the creation of a youth-inclusive development ecosystem. [Read more.](#)

Without development finance, the United States can't deliver on strategic investment

Atlantic Council

During the 2025 Annual Meetings of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), many of the speakers emphasized the decline in financing for development. Dismantling the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was the biggest hit in 2025, but official development assistance (ODA) has been shrinking since 2023. In the last two years, eleven member countries of the Development Assistance Committee have publicly announced budget cuts to their development aid programs.

The chart below shows an estimate of how much ODA could be lost from the 2023 baseline, if Group of Seven (G7) countries go through with their promised funding cuts. Major providers of ODA have announced cuts to aid spending for 2025 and beyond. 2024 marked the first time that the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Germany have all cut aid at the same time in nearly thirty years. As a result, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development estimates that ODA decreased by 9 percent in 2024 and could fall by as much as 17 percent in 2025. [Read more.](#)

Rethinking UK aid policy in an era of global funding cuts

Chatham House

The crisis in the global system of foreign aid is a problem for the effectiveness of the UK's own aid strategy. By 2026, global aid is expected to have declined by almost a third compared to its 2023 level, as spending cuts by many donors – including the UK and, most consequentially, the US – reduce funding for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, humanitarian response, and provision of global public goods such as vaccination or climate action.



Sacks of food aid at a camp for internally displaced persons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, December 2012. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

This paper examines how the UK government can best respond to the security and geopolitical risks of this new era of aid scarcity. Fiscal constraints, partly related to defence commitments, mean that additional funding for UK foreign aid is unlikely to be forthcoming. The aid budget is being cut to 0.3 per cent of gross national income by 2027. As a result, the government will need to do more with less, and be more selective and strategic in its approach. [Read more.](#)

Restoring Support for Foreign Assistance Requires Sharpening its Objectives

Council on Foreign Relations

Across the developed world, citizens and their governments are reconsidering what types of spending best advance their interests at home and abroad. From 2018 to 2023, foreign aid from wealthy governments to poorer countries grew steadily, averaging some 6 percent year-over-year globally. But over the past two years, a global retrenchment has occurred. In addition to the United States, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,

the United Kingdom, and others have all announced reductions to their foreign aid budgets.

According to recent analysis, that aid, referred to often as official development assistance, has fallen by between 15 and 22 percent relative to 2023. Simultaneously, global military expenditures reached \$2.7 trillion in 2024 on the back of the steepest year-on-year increase since the end of the Cold War.

[Read more.](#)

Reports of (US) Aid's Death Have Been (Somewhat) Exaggerated

Center for Global Development

Since taking office in January, the Trump administration has made clear it conceives of a dramatically scaled-back role for US investment in development and humanitarian response. The administration has taken a host of actions to realize its vision—from instituting a wide-reaching foreign aid freeze to dismantling the United States's largest aid agency and terminating thousands of existing foreign aid awards. But top officials have suggested some international assistance will remain, and lawmakers have signaled an interest in preserving an even larger share. As our colleagues have sought to document, the details of what stays and what goes—and of how the administration might execute its alternative design, particularly given tense budget and appropriations dynamics with Congress—have been difficult to parse.

Data recently published by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) offers insight into the status of major aid accounts at the end of fiscal year 2025 (September 30). Topline account numbers only tell part of the story, but provide an opportunity to compare trends in cumulative obligations and outlays with previous fiscal years. [Read more.](#)



The USAID building sits closed to employees after a memo was issued advising agency personnel to work remotely, in Washington, D.C., U.S., February 3, 2025. [PHOTO CREDITS](#)

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
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USG & MENA Expertise – Deep understanding of USG contracting and the political, economic, and cultural dynamics of the Middle East, bridging global expectations with local implementation.

Turnkey Proposal Support – Manages the full proposal development process, allowing clients to focus on project execution.

Efficient Project Costing – Delivers accurate cost estimates and streamlined proposal preparation for competitive and successful bids.

Rapid On-the-Ground Support – Conducts quick reconnaissance trips, providing real-time insights for operational readiness.

Company Information

Registered in 2022 in Virginia
UEI: GLVNQ7783YC8
CAGE Code: 9NJF9

PCS Codes: R406, R410, R429,
R431, R499, R607, R699, R707,
R799, D399, D302, D303, D305,
D306, D307, D308, D310, D318,
D322, D324

Business Size: Small and
Minority-owned

NAICS Codes: 928120,
541611, 541612, 541512,
541519, 541618, 561110,
561311, 561312, 561320,
561499, 611430

SAM Registration: Active

Commonwealth of Virginia
Designation: Micro Business



**We Grew our
Client Portfolios
by \$130 Million
in 2024.**

Past Performance

- **2025, IDG** – Worked with IDG leadership to draft a concept note on a Palestinian economic governance plan for the Gaza Day After.
- **2024, Palladium** – Led the development of a global youth workforce strategy and a growth strategy in the Middle East. Spearheaded a corporate strategy, positioning the firm for the Gaza Day After, including a monthly bulletin analyzing political and economic consequences and donor responses.
- **2024, IBI/URC** – Drafted a Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) growth strategy for the MENA region, including a \$43M Trade, Investment, and Blended Finance proposal.
- **2023, Panagora** – Led the capture and proposal development of a \$26M USAID MEL activity in the Middle East.
- **2022, USAID Middle East** – Contributed to USAID-funded regional research, leading two research questions to examine transitions in secondary education across 10 Middle Eastern countries.
- **2022, Creative Associates** – Led the design and proposal development for a \$25M TVET program in the Middle East.
- **2022, The World Bank** – Designed a model to engage 173 municipalities in the Middle East, focusing on livelihoods for local communities in partnership with MS.
- **2022, UNOPS** – Jabi Consulting played a pivotal role in launching a green economy initiative and establishing a Regional Green Community of Practice (GCoP). Facilitated stakeholder engagement, consultations, and strategic meetings to build consensus on a green finance framework.
- **2022, ILO** – Worked closely with the ILO team to design comprehensive TVET strategies for Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria, with a focus on integrating technology.
- **2022, Chemonics** – Led the design of an \$87M USAID economic growth proposal in the Middle East, which was successfully awarded to Chemonics.
- **2022, IBTCI** – Led the design and drafting of the management strategy for a third-party monitoring (TPM) proposal in the Middle East.
- **2021, The World Bank** – Designed a framework and drafted nine case studies on the impact of technology on youth entrepreneurship in the Middle East.